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In this paper, I aim to better understand why firms enter inter-organizational 
relationships. Previous studies have shown that firms engage in partnerships to 
internalize knowledge from its partners. I propose that firms form inter-firm ties to 
                                           
1 I am very grateful to my advisor, Professor Jaeyong Song, as well as Professors 
Dong-Kee Rhee, Theresa Cho, Keun Lee, Yongwook Paik, Joon Mahn Lee, and all 







acquire knowledge from their partner's R&D portfolio as well. Using VentureXpert 
and SDC Platinum databases, my findings show that Corporate Venture Capitals 
(CVCs) are more likely to invest in an entrepreneurial firm with an R&D partner over 
one without. Further, I find that my baseline findings are stronger in industries with 
weak intellectual property protection (IPP) regimes and when the venture firm's 
alliance partner operates in a similar industry with the CVC. To resolve endogeneity 
issues, I provide an additional analysis differentiating investor types. My paper 
indicates that, under certain contingencies, firms do engage in inter-firm relationships 
to learn from the partner's R&D portfolio. 
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“BOE, the biggest display manufacturer in China, has proposed setting up a 
joint venture in the organic light-emitting diode (OLED) business with 
partners of LG Display and Samsung Display, sources said Friday.... Analysts 
and officials; however, say if key Samsung and LG display partners join BOE 
for a joint venture in OLEDs, then issues over "technology leakage" will 
emerge as Korea is still ahead of companies in China in the OLED sector.” 
 –  The Korea Times, (2015)  
 
[Tsinghua] plans to inject a total of $2.6 billion into the three [companies, 
ChipMOS, Powertech, and SPIL] in exchange for stakes plus one board seat 
at each with no management control. The offers came after Micron 
Technology Inc. rejected Tsinghua's informal $23 billion takeover bid on the 
presumption of U.S. national security concerns. 
– Reuters (2015) 
 
The two tech companies in the opening anecdotes have entered inter-
organizational relationships seeking to acquire knowledge held by their 
partner firm’s partner. BOE has established joint ventures with the R&D 






equity investments in ChipMOS, a back-end company that assembles more 
than a billion of Micron’s DRAM and NAND chips, shortly after the Chinese 
tech giant failed to acquire Micron and Micron’s technology. This paper 
investigates firm motivations to enter inter-firm relationships. A central 
question I ask in this paper is whether firms engage in inter-firm relationships 
to gain knowledge through second-order ties (i.e., partner’s partner) and under 
what conditions firms do so. 
Scholars have long argued that internalizing partner’s skills and 
knowledge is a key motivation for firms to enter inter-firm relationships, such 
as joint ventures, strategic alliances, equity investments, and technological 
acquisitions (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; Hamel, 
1991; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley, & 
Silverman, 1996). However, such an explanation is insufficient to explain why 
tech firms choose to form ties with partner firms that lack apparent benefits. 
Tech leaders in knowledge intensive industries frequently collaborate with 
partners that retain inferior skills (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005) and invest in 
entrepreneurial firms with nascent technology (Gompers & Lerner, 2000). 
This paper proposes a novel explanation of why firms enter inter-firm 
ties — knowledge acquisition through second-order ties (Ahuja, 2000; 
Hernandez, Sanders, & Tuschke, 2015). I argue that a key motivation for 






firm’s partner. To test my argument, I examine large technology firms’ 
investment decisions in entrepreneurial firms. A burgeoning literature on 
Corporate Venture Capitals (CVC) has shown that large technology firms use 
equity investment as a toolkit to learn from entrepreneurial firms (Dushnitsky 
& Lenox, 2005b; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). Using VentureXpert database, I 
create CVC-venture dyads and find that an entrepreneurial firm is more likely 
to receive investments when it collaborates in R&D with other firms. I further 
test heterogeneous effects according to industry-level and firm-level 
characteristics. First, I examine industry’s intellectual property protection 
(IPP) regimes and show that my main hypothesis is significant in weak IPP 
regimes (e.g., semiconductor and electronics) but not significant in strong IPP 
regimes (e.g., biotech and pharmaceutical). Also, I investigate industry 
similarity between the venture’s R&D partner and the CVC to find that CVCs 
are more likely to invest in a start-up with an alliance partner when the partner 
operates in a similar industry to the CVC. 
Drawing causal inference is challenging in my research setting due to 
confounding factors. For example, if start-ups with R&D partners have better 
quality compared to those without, CVCs may invest in a venture with 
partners because it has superior quality. I attempt to resolve this endogeneity 
issue by differentiating investor types. Unlike CVCs, independent venture 






financial returns (Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016). I find that IVC investments 
are not sensitive to start-ups’ alliance portfolio when making equity 
investments in entrepreneurial firms. The result buttresses my view that CVCs 
make equity investments in venture firms in order to accumulate knowledge 
through second-order ties.  
My research mainly contributes to the partner selection literature. 
Studies in this literature stream have long questioned how firms choose 
partners during inter-firm relationships (Chung, Singh, Lee, & others, 2000; 
Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Li, Eden, Hitt, & 
Ireland, 2008; Reuer & Lahiri, 2013; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Literature 
has particularly focused on the dyadic characteristics between two partnering 
firms to explain this phenomenon. For instance, (Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008)) examine how technological complementariness and similarities 
between two firms influence the probability of alliance formation in 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Reuer and Lahiri (2013) focus 
on the geographical distance between two firms. However, firm motivation to 
enter inter-firm ties cannot be fully understood without considering partner’s 
alliance portfolio. The opening anecdotes show how partner firms can be mere 
conduits of knowledge rather than actual targets during interfirm 
relationships. My goal is to extend the partner selection literature by 






This study also adds to the recent empirical studies regarding the 
“swimming with sharks” dilemma (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Katila, 
Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008; Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, & Hallen, 
2015). This stream of literature has shown entrepreneurial firms’ strategies to 
protect themselves against knowledge misappropriation by incumbents. For 
example, Dushnitsky and Shaver (2009) show that venture firms are less 
likely to receive CVC investments under a high risk of misappropriation. 
Pahnke et al., (2015) show that start-ups decrease their innovativeness when 
exposed to competitors by venture capitals. I complement this literature by 
focusing on the sharks (i.e., knowledge-seeking firms) and delve into their 
strategies to overcome entrepreneurial firms’ protection strategies. My results 
suggest that established firms leverage second-order ties to acquire valuable 
knowledge from other firms, which are reluctant to share their knowledge 
with competitors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I explain 
my research setting. In section 3, I theorize why CVCs are more likely to 
invest in ventures that have (more) alliance partners and find contingencies. In 
section 4, I elaborate my empirical strategy. In section 5 and 6, I provide 
results and supplement it with an additional analysis. Finally, I conclude by 







II. EMPIRICAL SETTING 
My empirical setting focuses on large technology firms’ investment 
decisions in entrepreneurial firms, otherwise known as Corporate Venture 
Capital (CVC) investments. I examine whether CVC investment likelihood in 
an entrepreneurial firm is sensitive to the venture’s R&D portfolio. This 
research setting provides several advantages. First, knowledge transfer 
between CVCs and entrepreneurial firms is unilateral compared to other types 
of inter-firm relationships including alliances or joint ventures (Dushnitsky & 
Shaver, 2009; Mowery et al., 1996). The entrepreneurial finance market is a 
market for technology in which investors buy technology by making financial 
investments in entrepreneurial firms (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2004). 
Thus, knowledge flow from CVCs to ventures is limited whereas feasible vice 
versa. (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009). This unilateral knowledge flow prevents 
potential knowledge leakage through second-order ties from CVCs to venture 
partners, an outflow of knowledge which can deter CVCs from making 
investments (Pahnke et al., 2015). 
Second, literature has not fully understood why CVCs make 
investments in entrepreneurial firms. Entrepreneurial firms that receive 
investment often propose an ambiguous value with uncertain technology. I 






significant role in those ventures receiving investment. Although I limit my 
analysis to a specific setting due to several merits, I believe that my findings 
can be generalized to other types of inter-organizational relationships as well. 
 
 
III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Baseline Hypothesis 
Entrepreneurial firms gain knowledge during R&D collaborations in 
two ways. First, the two firms create new knowledge by recombining each 
other’s. Many large-scale empirical studies suggest a positive relationship 
between strategic alliances and firm innovation performance (Schilling, 2015; 
Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Newly created knowledge result in new product 
development or enhance tacit knowledge held by startups’ employees (Argote 
& Ingram, 2000). Second, knowledge flows from incumbents to 
entrepreneurial firms (Kogut, 1988; Mowery et al., 1996). Knowledge 
transferred from venture’s R&D partners reside in tasks and employees of 
ventures (Argote & Ingram, 2000). 
The newly created (transferred) knowledge with (from) R&D partners 
becomes marginal benefits to CVCs. CVCs gain opportunities to learn from 






(Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Wadhwa & Kotha, 
2006). Learning occurs through various means including maintaining board 
seats, exchanging liaison teams, conducting due diligence, etc. (for a review 
see Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b). CVCs gain access to new product 
developments by conducting due-diligence and acquire knowledge embedded 
in human capital by exchanging liaison teams. CVCs also monitor start-ups to 
accumulate knowledge in start-ups’ tasks. The upshot is that CVCs benefit 
from knowledge created by (or transferred from) the venture’s alliance 
portfolio by making equity investments start-ups. 
A recent real-world example elaborates the theoretical claim made in 
this paper. In December 2012, Cisco Systems agreed to collaborate in R&D 
with Streetline, an entrepreneurial firm that develops parking applications for 
drivers. In May 2014, two years after their partnership, Cisco has successfully 
combined their IOT technology with Streetline’s sensors and developed new 
parking solutions and IOT gateways which allow Streetline’s parking data to 
be transmitted through Cisco’s city Wi-Fi. Interestingly, in January 2013 (a 
few months after Cisco and Streetline’s collaboration), Qualcomm Ventures, 
participated in Streetline’s series C funding. Qualcomm Ventures is a firm that 
has consistently shown strong interest to diversify into IOT. 
I argue that CVCs invest in venture firms in order to acquire 






this argument, I first examine whether, all else being equal, CVCs are more 
likely to invest in ventures with alliance partners over ventures without. 
Ideally, such a correlation suggests that CVCs are motivated by the venture’s 
alliance portfolio when making equity investments in start-ups. Thus, my first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: CVCs are more likely to in a startup with an R&D 
collaboration partner over one without. 
 
3.2 Moderating Hypotheses 
 In this section, I moderate my baseline hypothesis according to 
industry-level and partner firm-level variables. The moderators serve two 
purposes. First, I aim to find contingencies in which second-order ties matter. 
At the industry level, I focus on industry’s intellectual property protection 
(IPP) regimes. I expect CVCs that operate in weak IPP industries to be more 
sensitive to start-ups’ alliance portfolio when making equity investments. At 
the partner firm-level, I examine industry similarity between a CVC and a 
venture’s R&D partner. I expect CVCs to invest in an entrepreneurial firm 
more when the start-up’s R&D partner operates in a similar industry to them. 






arise when ventures with R&D partners have better technology. Under such 
correlations, an entrepreneurial firm can signal higher quality to CVCs by 
having alliance partners (Spence, 1973). For instance, Qualcomm may have 
invested in Streetline not because Qualcomm sought to acquire knowledge 
from Cisco but because such partnership signals high-quality to CVCs. This is 
an alternative explanation that can drive the same results as Hypothesis 1. 
Thus, the moderators in this paper provide evidence that the baseline 
hypothesis is not caused by this alternative explanation but by my proposed 
mechanism of knowledge seeking through second-order ties. 
 
Intellectual property protection (IPP) regimes 
I first moderate my baseline hypothesis using industry IPP regimes. I 
expect my main hypothesis to be stronger in industries with weak IPP 
regimes, as knowledge acquisition is easier in such industries. Teece defined 
IPP regimes as “the environmental factors, excluding firm and market 
structure, that govern an innovator’s ability to capture the profits generated by 
an innovation” (Teece, 1986). IPP regimes heavily affect a firm’s ability to 
defend its knowledge against leakage to other firms. In a strong IPP industry, 
new products that are developed during R&D collaborations are easily 
protected by patents or secrecy. Thus, learning from ventures’ alliance 






classify semiconductor, electronic components, and electronic equipment 
industries as weak IPP industries and biotech, pharmaceutical, and chemical 
industries as strong IPP industries. (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; 
Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009). According to the Carnegie Melon Survey (CMS) 
of inter-industry variation in IPP regimes, these are the top and bottom three 
industries that score the highest or the lowest in patent protection (Cohen et 
al., 2000). Hypothesis 2 is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The positive impact of a startup’s R&D partner on CVC 
investment likelihood (i.e., Hypothesis 1) will be stronger when a CVC operates 
in a weak IPP industry. 
  
Hypotheses 2 serves to defend against the alternative explanation 
based on the signaling effect theory. I employ the idea that the direction of 
Hypothesis 2 would be the opposite (i.e., Hypothesis 1 would be stronger in 
industries with strong IPP regimes) if the baseline hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) 
is supported due to signaling effects. Literature shows that alliance partners 
serve as strong quality signals particularly in biotech and pharmaceutical 
industries. (Nicholson, Danzon, & McCullough, 2002). Thus, having R&D 






pharmaceutical industries (i.e., strong IPP regimes) compared to other 
industries. The direction of each mechanism is summarized in Table 1. To sum 
up, if supported, Hypothesis 2 strengthens the claim that my proposed 
mechanism in Hypothesis 1 is correct. 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Industry similarity between CVC and alliance partner 
Not all second-order ties will attract CVCs, as not all knowledge 
benefits are equal. In particular, industry similarity between CVCs and 
venture’s alliance partner heavily affects the size of knowledge benefits. The 
industry similarity between two firms affects their ability to absorb knowledge 
from each other (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Moreover, knowledge of related 
products and customers are more valuable than that of non-related knowledge 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Recall how BOE 
has established joint ventures with partner firms of Samsung and LG, two 
leading firms in the same industry. I hypothesize that industry similarity 








Hypothesis 3: The positive impact of a startup’s R&D partner on CVC 
investment likelihood (i.e., Hypotheses 1) will be stronger when a CVC operates 




I use Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert and SDC Platinum databases 
as my primary data sources. Using VentureXpert database, I collect 
information of all expansion stage U.S. venture rounds that took place during 
2011-2013. I limit my analysis to a single stage (expansion stage) and a short 
period of time (three years) in order to reduce unnecessary variation among 
venture rounds. I focus on expansion stage among many investment stages 
because CVC investment is most frequent during that stage. In addition, I 
chose my three-year analysis period (2011-2013) in order to give sufficient 
amount of time for the entrepreneurial finance market to recover after the 
2008 financial crisis. From my venture rounds, I identify (1) all CVCs that 
have made at least one investment in an entrepreneurial firm and (2) all 
ventures that have received funding from a venture capital during my analysis 
period. I exclude start-ups founded before 2000 to focus on newly founded 






1,597 VC-backed U.S. entrepreneurial firms and 67 CVCs. 
My unit of analysis is CVC-venture dyads. Studies in the partner 
selection literature have primarily used dyadic-level analysis (Dushnitsky & 
Shaver, 2009; Hellmann, Lindsey, & Puri, 2008; Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008). Using 1,597 ventures and 67 CVCs identified above, I create 106,999 
(1597 × 67) dyads. Among the 106,999 dyads, I exclude 199 dyads because 
their CVC-venture relationship has already been materialized before 
expansion stage (i.e., realized at “Early” or “Seed” stage). Thus, my final 
sample consists of 106,800 potential CVC-venture dyads. My econometric 
strategy is to estimate the probability that a CVC-venture dyad relationship 
will materialize, using logit regression. 
 
4.2 Dependent Variable 
Investment  
My main dependent variable is a binary variable that denotes the 
presence (one) or an absence (zero) of an investment dyad. Namely, this 
variable indicates a value of one if the focal CVC in the dyad participates in 








4.3 Independent Variables 
I use two variables to measure the presence and size of the venture firm’s 
R&D portfolio. 
 
Alliance (binary variable)  
First, I use a dichotomous variable that indicates one if the start-up 
has established at least one R&D partnership prior to receiving investment at 
the expansion stage. 
 
Number of alliances (count variable)  
Similarly, I use a count variable that measures the total number of 
alliance partnerships the entrepreneurial firm has established prior to entering 
expansion stage funding. 
  
4.4 Moderating Variables 
IPP Regime (binary)  
This variable indicates whether the CVC operates in an industry with strong 
or weak IPP regime. The Carnegie Melon Survey (CMS) of R&D measures 
the inter-industry variation in IPP regimes (Cohen et al., 2000). Following the 






score patent protection as effective and as weak if otherwise (Anand & 
Khanna, 2000; Shane, 2001). In this paper, as aforementioned, I designate 
semiconductor, electronic equipment, and electronic component industries as 
weak IPP industries and biotech, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries as 
strong IPP industries. 
 
CVC-Alliance Partner Industry Similarity 
I use four-digit SIC codes to measure industry similarity which scales 
from 0 to 1. Specifically, I give this variable a value of 0.25, if the first one-
digit of the CVC’s SIC code and the alliance partner’s SIC code match. I give 
the value 0.5 if the first two digits match and 0.75 if three-digits match. The 
variable becomes 1 if the SIC codes are the same for both firms. In cases where 
the venture firm has more than one alliance partner, I use the maximum value 
among all partners. This is to account for that fact that CVCs are most likely to 
benefit from an alliance partner that operates in the most similar industry to 
them. 
 
4.5 Control Variables 
Controlling for venture quality is critical amongst all. I use variables 






venture quality.  
 
Ex-post IPO (binary) 
This variable is a binary variable that equals one if the 
entrepreneurial firm successfully went public after expansion stage funding. 
Following the literature, I use start-up’s success to IPO as a proxy for its 
quality (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Gompers & Lerner, 2000). 
 
Log(Amount) ($000) 
This variable is the logarithm of the total amount of funding the 
start-up received prior to expansion stage funding. A venture firm’s prior 
valuations will reflect its overall quality. 
 
Number of investors 
This variable is the sum of the total number of investors that have 
invested in the venture firm before the venture received expansion stage 
funding. I contend that the number of investors that invested in the start-up is 
related to venture quality. 
 
Number of rounds 






firm has received prior to entering expansion stage funding. I exploit this 
variable to control for heterogeneity among venture funding rounds. 
 
Venture Age 




This is a binary variable that equals one if the venture firm is located 
in California. I control for this variable as start-ups in California may benefit 
from knowledge spillover (Audretsch, 1998). 
 
CVC-venture industry similarity 
This variable measures the industry similarity between the CVC and 
the venture. I measure this variable by using SIC codes. The measurement for 
this variable is exactly the same as the variable CVC-alliance partner industry 
similarity, but here I compare SIC codes of the CVC and the venture firm. 
 
Industry 
This is a categorical variable that controls for the industry of the 






industries: communications; construction; electric, gas, and sanitary; finance; 
manufacturing; mining; retail; services; software; transportation; wholesale. 
 
Prior CVC investment 
This is a binary variable that indicates one if the venture has received 
investment from a CVC, other than the focal CVC in the dyad. I control for 
this variable because prior ties to CVCs may increase the likelihood of a 
venture to receive further CVC investments. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of my data. Some 
stylized facts are worth mentioning. First, the mean value of investment is 
0.002, which indicates that about 0.2% of the total potential relationships were 
actually realized. The mean value for alliance is 0.093, which means that 
about 10% of the ventures have at least one alliance experience. 
---------------------------------------- 










Table 3 provides analyses for Hypothesis 1. The independent 
variable in Model 1 is alliance, a binary variable that indicates one if the 
venture has at least one R&D partner prior to entering the funding round of 
interest (i.e., expansion stage). Alliance is significantly positive at the 1% 
level, supporting Hypothesis 1. The independent variable in Model 2 is 
Number of alliances. This is a count variable that sums the number of R&D 
partnerships a start-up has made before entering the funding round of interest. 
The coefficient for Number of alliances is not significantly different from 
zero. This indicates that the total number of alliance partners do not 
significantly impact investment likelihood, although the presence of second-
order ties does. This may be because CVCs target specific R&D partners 
rather than seek knowledge from the whole portfolio when investing in 
startups with R&D partners. In such cases, the size of the alliance portfolio 
would not matter to CVCs. 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
                                           






Table 4 provides an analysis of Hypothesis 2. The independent 
variable is again alliance. Using the CMS Survey, I divide ventures into two 
groups: weak IPP and strong IPP (Cohen et al., 2000; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 
2009). I classify biotech, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals as industries with 
strong IPP, and semiconductor, electronic components, and electric equipment 
as weak IPP. The coefficient of alliance is significantly positive in weak IPP 
industries but not significantly different from zero in strong IPP industries. 
The results strongly support Hypothesis 2 (Hoetker, 2007). 
The results from Table 4 support the fact that my baseline hypothesis 
is caused by my proposed mechanism. If the results in my baseline hypothesis 
were caused by alternative explanations such as signaling effects of venture 
quality, there is no reason for the results to be stronger in weak IPP industries. 
Rather, the results would be stronger in biotech or pharmaceutical industries 
as signal effects are stronger in these industries. 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Table 5 tests Hypothesis 3. In this analysis, I compare venture firms 
based on their alliance partner’s characteristics. Thus, I limit my analysis to 






analysis is CVC-Alliance Partner Industry Similarity. This variable is a 5-
scale variable that measures how many first digits of the CVC and the 
venture’s alliance partner match. The results show that CVC-Alliance Partner 
Industry Similarity is positively significant at the 10% level. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 is weakly supported. 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
VI. ADDTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Do CVCs invest in ventures with alliance partners to learn from 
second-order ties or do they simply choose ventures with the best quality? I 
address this question by conducting a separate analysis that differentiates 
investor types. IVCs (independent venture capitals) are pure financial 
investors that seek financial returns through IPO, whereas CVCs are 
technology firms that aim to learn from entrepreneurial firms by making 
investments in them (Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016). The key idea is that 
venture’s R&D partners will affect CVCs and IVCs differently. In other 
words, knowledge benefits provided by ventures’ alliance portfolio will attract 






investors have no interest in acquiring external technology. 
If my baseline results are caused by signaling effects, on the other 
hand, venture’s R&D partners will have significant effects on both IVC and 
CVC investment likelihood. Namely, the quality of ventures is important for 
both types of investors, despite their different motivations to invest in start-
ups. CVCs aim to learn from start-ups with the highest quality, and IVCs try 
to identify ventures with good quality to increase their chance of IPO.  
I identify one hundred IVCs that have made the most frequent 
investments in entrepreneurial firms during 2011-2013 using the VentureXpert 
database. With these 100 IVCs, I replicate the dyadic analysis conducted in 
Hypothesis 1. Table 5 provides my results. The results show that I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the effect of venture’s alliance portfolio on IVC 
investment is significantly different from zero. The results support the claim 
that CVCs chose to invest in a venture with R&D partners, not because 
alliance partners signal better quality but because CVCs seek to acquire 
knowledge from second-order ties. 
--------------------------------------- 










In this paper, I aim to answer the following question: Do CVCs invest 
in entrepreneurial firms to acquire knowledge of the start-up’s R&D partners? 
Building on alliance and entrepreneurship literature, I theorize how CVCs can 
benefit from venture’s R&D partners. I build a large dataset from the 
VentureXpert and SDC Platinum databases to test my hypotheses. My 
findings from logit regressions suggest that there is a strong correlation 
between ventures’ alliance experience and CVC investment likelihood. I 
further find contingencies based on industry IPP regimes and industry 
similarity. Finally, I conduct a separate analysis using IVCs to strengthen 
casualty. Collectively, my results suggest that CVCs are more likely to invest 
in ventures with R&D partners because of the knowledge benefits provided by 
the venture’s R&D partners. 
My findings contribute to two separate literature streams. First, I 
contribute to the partner selection literature. No study, as far as I know, has 
considered second-order ties to be important in a firm’s partner selection 
decision. However, from my point of view, it is difficult to understand real 
world phenomena without considering second-order ties. I also contribute to 
the “swimming with sharks” literature. Scholars have mostly focused on firm 






leaving sharks’ side uncharted. I suggest that firms rely on second-order ties 
to acquire external knowledge when knowledge acquisition through direct ties 
is limited. Although my research setting is limited to the entrepreneurial 
finance market, I believe that my findings can help explain other inter-firm 
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TABLE 1: Direction of Second-order Ties 
 
Impact of Second-
order ties on 
investment likelihood 





(Protected by patents) 
Signaling Effect - 
Strong 











TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Investment 0.002 0.05          
2 Alliance (binary) 0.093 0.29 0.006         
3 Number of alliances 0.342 1.67 0.002 0.465        
4 Ex-post IPO 0.027 0.16 -0.003 0.051 0.077       
5 Log (Amount) 10.128 1.87 0.017 0.08 0.064 0.113      
6 Number of Investors 6.462 3.91 0.032 0.046 0.057 0.081 0.568     
7 Number of Rounds 5.759 3.28 0.012 0.096 0.097 0.055 0.478 0.577    
8 Venture Age 5.106 1.41 -0.007 0.087 0.066 0.05 0.044 0.041 0.22   
9 California 0.439 0.5 0.012 0.043 0.015 0.059 0.205 0.157 0.04 -0.048  
10 
CVC-Alliance 






TABLE 3: Likelihood of CVC Investments 
 
*p<0.1; ** p <0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
DV: Investment Model 1 Model 2 
(Intercept) -20.10 (1313.29) 
-20.186 
(1313.29) 
Alliance Portfolio 0.41** (0.17)  
Number of alliances  0.037 (0.03) 
ln (Amount) 0.06 (0.05) 0.061 (0.05) 
Ex-post IPO -0.71* (0.42) -0.738* (0.42) 
Number of Investors 0.13*** (0.02) 0.127*** (0.02) 
Number of Rounds -0.05* (0.02) -0.043* (0.02) 
Venture Age -0.06 (0.04) -0.050 (0.04) 
California 0.21* (0.12) 0.213* (0.12) 
Industry: Communications 12.54 (1313.29) 12.556 (1313.29) 
Industry: Construction 12.88 (1313.29) 12.931 (1313.29) 
Industry:  
Electric, Gas, Sanitary 
-0.69 (1354.36) -0.615 (1354.5) 
Industry: Finance 12.57 (1313.29) 12.600 (1313.29) 
Industry: Manufacturing 13.37 (1313.29) 13.395 (1313.29) 
Industry: Mining -0.54 (1417.91) -0.542 (1417.88) 
Industry: Retail 13.20 (1313.29) 13.273 (1313.29) 
Industry: Services 12.89 (1313.29) 12.932 (1313.29) 
Industry: Software 13.14 (1313.29) 13.179 (1313.29) 
Industry: Transportation 12.80 (1313.29) 12.838 (1313.29) 
Industry: Wholesale -0.01 (1374.08) -0.006 (1374.07) 
CVC-Venture industry 
similarity 
0.842*** (0.16) 0.842*** (0.16) 







TABLE 4: Industry IPP Regimes 
 
*p<0.1; **<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Dependent Variable: 
Investment 
































































TABLE 5: Industry Similarity 
 
*p<0.1; **<0.05; ***p<0.01 










Number of Investors 
0.13*** 
(0.15) 












CVC-venture industry similarity 
0.94*** 
(0.44) 















Table 6: Likelihood of IVC Investment 
 
*p<0.1; **<0.05; ***p<0.01 
  









Number of Investors 
0.01 
(0.01) 


























위 논문은 기업형 벤처캐피털이 왜 벤처기업에 투자하는지 연구한다. 
그 동안의 연구들은 기업형 벤처캐피털의 주요 투자목적이 벤처기업으로부터의 
지식습득에 있다고 말해왔다. 본 연구는 기업형 벤처캐피털의 투자목적이 
단순히 벤처기업의 지식습득에 있는 것이 아니라, 벤처의 연구개발 
파트너로부터의 지식습득에도 있음을 주장한다. 본 연구는 벤처엑스퍼트 및 
SDC 플래티넘 데이터베이스를 활용하여, 벤처기업이 연구개발 파트너가 있을 
경우 (파트너가 없을 경우보다) 기업형 벤처캐피털로부터 투자 받을 확률이 
유의하게 높아짐을 보인다. 또한 특정 산업의 특허를 통한 지적재산권 
보호강도와 벤처캐피털과 벤처의 연구개발 파트너간의 산업 유사도를 통한 
조절효과를 분석하여 인과관계를 추론한다. 
 
   주요어 : 혁신, 기업간 상호관계, 기업형 벤처캐피털, 지식습득  
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